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Abstract 
This paper presents a viscous population multi-agent 
system, which is claimed to provide scope for the 
emergence of cooperation both through iterated interaction 
and through kin selection. Theoretical examinations of 
iterated interaction and kin selection within the model are 
conducted and compared with empirical results. It is 
concluded that the model does allow for the operation both 
of iterated interaction and kin selection. The methods 
presented in the paper allow the operation of the two 
mechanisms to be distinguished in any instance of the 
model. 
Introduction 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), first formalised by Tucker, 
is a well known metaphor for social interactions between 
individuals in which there is a dilemma over whether to 
act cooperatively or selfishly. In the single shot PD selfish 
behaviour is the only rational outcome (Nash 1950,1951). 
However (Axelrod 1984) proposed iterated interaction in 
the PD as a mechanism for promoting cooperation. 
 An alternative explanation for the evolution of 
cooperative behaviour in populations exists in (Hamilton 
1964)’s theory of kin selection. Kin selection theory 
expects cooperative behaviour to be favoured in situations 
in which an individual’s behaviour has an effect on the 
reproductive success of its relatives. In particular, so-
called “viscous populations”, in which individuals have 
limited dispersal and so tend to interact with relatives, 
provide such a situation. However, in these same 
populations, there is a potential force opposing the 
operation of kin selection, namely competition among 
relatives for finite resources. 
 Kin selection has previously been examined through 
computer simulation by (Oliphant 1994). Oliphant’s 
model used genetic algorithms in a one-dimensional 
spatial environment to model individuals playing the non-
iterated PD with their neighbours, and producing offspring 
within the same neighbourhoods. The results from the 
model showed that cooperation could emerge in such an 
environment through kin selection. 
 This paper presents a multi-agent evolutionary model 
with the PD as the model of social interaction. The model 
allows for the evolution of cooperation through kin 
selection as in (Oliphant 1994) as well as through iterated 
interaction. A mathematical investigation of the influence 
of repeated interaction and kin selection in the model is 
presented, and conclusions are drawn on empirical results 
in the light of these investigations. 
The Model 
The model described in this paper was implemented using 
the Swarm software from the Swarm Development Group 
(http://www.swarm.org). Source code for the model is 
available from one of the authors’ websites 
(http://www.mk.dmu.ac.uk/~jmarshall). 
Model Overview 
The model used comprises a population of agents, and an 
environment in which they are situated. The environment 
is simply a grid of cells, with each edge of the grid 
wrapped around to meet its opposite edge, thus forming a 
torus. This type of toroidal environment has become 
widespread in artificial life models, such as that presented 
in (Nowak and May 1993). Each cell is capable of 
housing any number of agents from zero upwards. Cells 
are used as the local area of interaction, i.e. agents can 
only play the PD with, and mate with, agents in the cell 
they currently inhabit. At each time step, agents are able 
to move to any of the eight adjacent cells with a certain 
probability.  In addition to this physical environment, 
there are eight environmental variables, namely the 
mutation rate, the parameterised crossover rate, the 
maximum population the environment can support, the 
initial population, the death probability, the movement 
probability, the initial agent energy, and the energy cost 
for living. These variables are described in the following 
sections. 
Agent Description 
Each agent is defined as having a chromosome, an energy 
level, and a memory of PD interactions with other agents. 
For every other “opponent” that an agent has interacted 
with during its lifetime the agent remembers both the last 
actions of itself and its “opponent” (cooperate (C) or 
defect (D) in each case). This memory is used to 
determine the action an agent will take next time it meets the same “opponent”. The mapping of this interaction 
history to an action is achieved by the agent’s strategy 
chromosome. 
 The agents’ chromosomes specify characteristics of the 
agents, and are used during interaction and mating. These 
chromosomes are based on (Holland 1975)’s pioneering 
work using genetic algorithms in adaptive artificial 
systems. 
 Following (Mar and St. Denis 1994), a five loci 
chromosome is used, each locus having two alleles, a 
cooperation allele and a defection allele. This 
chromosome describes a “two-dimensional” strategy, 
which specifies a cooperate or defect action based on the 
previous action of each interacting individual. Four loci 
are used to specify actions based on this previous pair of 
interactions. The remaining locus is used to specify an 
initial action when the agent has never interacted with its 
opponent before. 
 Lastly, the agents also have an energy level, initialised 
at their “birth” and decreased by a certain amount every 
time step. Agents “die” when their energy level reaches 
zero, and the only way to replenish this energy and thus 
survive longer is by receiving payoffs from PD 
interactions with other agents. The PD payoffs used were 
temptation T = 5, reward R = 3, punishment P = 1 and 
sucker’s payoff S = 0. 
Model Operation 
The operation of the model is now described. In the first 
stage an initial population is created, of a size specified by 
an environmental variable, and randomly distributed over 
the environment. Each agent’s initial energy level is set to 
a specified level. In the second stage, each agent’s energy 
level is decreased by the “living cost” specified.  Any 
agent whose energy level reaches zero is removed from 
the population. The next stage terminates agents randomly 
according to the probability of death in the environment. 
These two methods of termination correspond to “death 
by starvation” and by “natural causes”. In the fourth stage 
all the agents move to an adjacent cell with a certain 
probability. This probability can be changed to vary the 
population viscosity, the implications of which are 
discussed in the next section. Next, agents are randomly 
paired up within each cell, and each pair plays one round 
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The action each agent chooses 
will be determined by their interaction history together, 
and their individual strategy chromosomes. As a result of 
this, agents’ energy levels are increased in the next stage 
by the payoff received from the PD interaction. Finally 
the agents in a cell are again randomly paired, and 
produce offspring with a probability 1 - P, where P is the 
proportion of the maximum possible population that the 
current population represents, and 0 <= P <= 1. On 
completion of this stage the model re-enters the second 
stage and executes as before. 
 A pair of agents reproduce to combine their genetic 
material into one offspring agent, whose energy level is 
initialised appropriately. The genetic operators used in the 
reproduction process are (Spears and DeJong 1991)’s 
parameterised crossover operator, and a standard mutation 
operator. 
Kin Selection 
A Necessary Condition for Kin Selection 
There is one fundamental condition for the operation of 
kin selection, that the behaviour of an individual has an 
effect on the reproductive success of its relatives 
(Hamilton 1964). Our model addresses this condition in 
two ways. First, the local random movement of agents 
leads to PD interactions among relatives, as a result of the 
agents’ mating and interaction neighbourhoods being 
identical. Second, agents’ behaviour has an effect on 
relatives’ reproductive success, because payoffs from PD 
interactions are used as “energy” which is necessary for 
an agent’s continued survival. Therefore exploitation of a 
relative (or indeed any other agent) will directly harm 
them by depriving them of vital “energy”. This can 
directly contribute to their “death”. The method of local 
interaction and mating described above creates what is 
termed a viscous population, which provides a suitable 
environment for kin selection to operate. As (Hamilton 
1964) said, “we would expect to find giving traits 
commonest and most highly developed in the species with 
the most viscous populations whereas uninhibited 
competition should characterise species with the most 
freely mixing populations.” 
The Opposing Forces of Kin Selection 
When considering kin selection as a potential explanation 
for cooperative behaviour, it is important to note the 
possible existence of mechanisms counter-acting its 
operation. Such a counteracting mechanism could exist in 
the form of competition between relatives for finite 
resources. (Wilson, Pollock and Dugatkin 1992) studied a 
viscous population model and concluded that the effects 
of these opposing mechanisms exactly cancelled each 
other, reducing evolutionary fitness to the simplest form 
of individual fitness. (Taylor 1992a) concluded the same 
for homogenous environments, as well as extending their 
results to patch-structured populations (Taylor 1992b). 
However others, such as (Kelly 1992,1994) and (Queller 
1994), argued against these claims. (Kelly 1994) in 
particular suggested that regulation of a population at the 
global rather than local level would still allow kin 
selection to be effective. The model studied in this paper 
implements such global population regulation. 
Examination of the Implicit Shadow of the 
Future 
Based on the model described above, it is possible to 
make some simple calculations about the probability of repeated interaction between two agents. Due to the 
undecidability inherent in such models (Grim 1994), even 
those without stochastic elements, these are limited to 
calculations from one time step to the next. However, we 
can still use these calculations to get an impression of the 
implicit “shadow of the future” (Axelrod 1984). The 
shadow of the future is defined as the probability that two 
agents will interact again at some point in the future. If 
the shadow of the future is large then iterated interaction 
is likely, and so cooperation is favoured. If, however, the 
shadow of the future is small, then single iteration 
encounters are common, and so defection is favoured. 
 The following equation calculates the probability of 
two consecutive interactions between the same agents, 
where m represents the agents’ movement probability, d 
the environmental death probability, and p the size of the 
local population in an agent’s cell. It should be noted that 
it is difficult to take into account the probability of an 
agent’s death through running out of energy. 
Repeated interaction in the model is a geometric process, 
ignoring death by “starvation”. Given one interaction, the 
probability there will be another is 1/(1-q), where q is the 
repeated interaction probability from the previous formula.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Expected number of interactions between agent pairs, 
under varying movement probability 
 
 The results of this calculation are presented in figure 1 
above. The parameters used to draw this graph are: d = 
0.05. As local population level p varies according to 
movement probability m in the model, the value for p at 
each value of m was taken from empirical data gathered 
from the model. 
Examination of Inclusive Fitness of 
Cooperation and Defection Alleles 
Not all the loci on an agent’s chromosome are subject to 
kin selection. Some loci are used only in interactions 
where both agents will see the same interaction history 
and therefore use the same locus to determine their 
actions. Hence kin selection cannot operate on these loci. 
However interactions using the remaining loci will always 
result in each interacting agent using a different locus to 
determine their action. At these loci alleles can benefit 
copies of themselves in an “opponent” agent through 
increasing the fitness of the “opponent” agent, possibly at 
the expense of agent in which they are carried. For these 
loci it is interesting to calculate the inclusive fitness of 
cooperation and defection alleles, to gain a greater 
understanding of the potential for the operation of kin 
selection within the model. This calculation is presented 
below. In the following equations, T, R, S and P represent 
the payoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, c represents the 
frequency of cooperators in the environment, r represents 
the relatedness of the agents at the locus of the allele 
whose fitness we are considering. 
 Inclusive fitness of cooperation allele: 
(Rc + S(1 - c)) + ((Rc + T(1 - c))r) 
 Inclusive fitness of defection allele: 
(Tc + P(1 - c)) + ((Sc + P(1 - c))r) 
 In each of these equations, the first term represents the 
fitness of the allele in one interacting agent, the second 
term represents the fitness of a copy of that allele in its 
“opponent” agent, multiplied by a coefficient of 
relatedness. This is the standard inclusive fitness 
calculation (Hamilton 1964), interpreting payoff from a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma interaction as reproductive potential. 
Each fitness term is calculated as the average payoff 
received by the agent weighted by the frequency of 
cooperators in the environment (i.e. the probability that an 
agent’s “opponent” will cooperate in an interaction).  
 These two equations were used to draw the graph 
shown below in figure 2, given the following parameters: 
T = 5, R = 3, S = 0, P = 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Relative fitness of cooperation and defection alleles at 
loci subject to kin selection 
 
 The inclusive fitness results in figure 2 above clearly 
show that the model supports kin selection. This can be 
seen by observing that, for the loci we are considering, the 
C allele is fittest at high relatedness levels. 
Presentation and Discussion of Results 
Experiments were run to observe the effect of varying 
population viscosity in the model, through changing the 
movement probability of agents, as follows: the 
experiments were conducted in 11 parameter 
configurations, sweeping the movement probability from 
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fittest0 to 1 inclusive in increments of 0.1. For each parameter 
configuration 20 runs of 1000 time steps each were 
conducted. For each run, the average cooperation over the 
entire run was calculated, and this was used to calculate 
the average and standard deviation of the cooperation 
level for each value of the movement probability. The 
average number of interactions between any two 
interacting agents was also calculated, as well as the 
average relatedness of interacting agent pairs. Relatedness 
was calculated using the following formula from (Collins 
and Jefferson 1991), where fi  = frequency of allele 1 (for 
example) at locus i, l = number of loci being compared 
and 0 1 £ £ D . The relatedness of two interacting agents 
was therefore calculated as 1-D, with l = 5. 
The other model parameters were as follows: environment 
width and height = 10, maximum agent population = 200, 
initial agent population = 75, mutation rate = 0.01, 
parameterised crossover rate = 0.1, death probability = 
0.05, initial agent energy = 15, living cost = 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Global cooperation level among all agents in model 
 
 In figure 3 the cooperation level, averaged globally over 
all types of interaction, behaves as predicted both by 
iterated interaction and kin selection theory, increasing as 
population viscosity increases (agent movement 
probability decreases). It is interesting to note, however, 
that cooperation levels remain low across all movement 
probabilities, only approaching the mean at the lowest 
movement probabilities. 
 Figure 4 below presents the average number of 
interactions within agent pairs in the experiment, while 
figure 5 presents the average relatedness of pairs of 
interacting agents. 
 In figure 4, average number of interactions could be 
considered to be well correlated with average cooperation 
level in the model. Both values exhibit the same increase 
under decreasing movement probability, peaking at 
movement probability 0.1, subsequently falling at 
movement probability 0. In fact the only obvious 
difference between the curves of average cooperation 
level and average interaction length is the magnitude of 
fall at movement probability 0. 
 Comparing the theoretical predictions shown in figure 1 
with the empirical results presented in figure 4, it can be 
seen that there is a close match, apart from some 
discrepancies at movement probabilities 0.1 and 0.2. It is 
suggested that the reason for these discrepancies is that 
the theoretical calculations cannot take account of death 
by “starvation”, which may become increasingly 
important at the lower movement probabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Average number of interactions within agent pairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Average relatedness of interacting agent pairs 
 
 Figure 5 shows a high degree of relatedness within 
interacting agent pairs. However this relatedness level is 
comparatively constant over movement probability. 
 In addition to these results, further cooperation and 
relatedness data was collected from the experiments, 
focussing on a subset of the initial data. Figure 6 and 
figure 7 below present the average cooperation level and 
relatedness of agent pairs respectively, for interactions 
determined by the two loci subject to kin selection. The 
motivation for studying this subset of the data was 
presented in the section entitled “Examination of Inclusive 
Fitness of Cooperation and Defection Alleles”. 
 Figure 6 shows a noisy cooperation level that does not 
vary with movement probability, but remains around the 
mean cooperation level found in the absence of selection. 
 Figure 7 shows the same high relatedness level 
observed in figure 5. It is interesting to note that while 
relatedness does increase as population viscosity increases 
(movement probability decreases), this increase is not as 
pronounced as (Hamilton  1964) suggested it might be. 
Possible explanations for this may include the existence of 
forces counteracting the operation of kin selection, as 
outlined under the heading “The Opposing Forces of Kin 
Selection”. Alternatively, the particular parameters used 
for the experiments, more particularly the PD parameters, 
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)may not allow kin selection to operate effectively. This is 
suggested by the cooperation levels presented in figure 6, 
which are based around the mean cooperation level found 
in the absence of selection, and do not show any trend 
over varying movement probability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Average cooperation level for interactions using loci 
subject to kin selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Average relatedness of interacting agent pairs for 
interactions using loci subject to kin selection 
 
 Returning to the theoretical result presented in figure 2, 
and taking the empirical relatedness level from figure 7, 
we can suggest an explanation for the observed mean 
cooperation level by examining the parameter space of 
relative C and D allele fitness. Looking at figure 2 with a 
relatedness level of between 0.6 and 0.7 (taken from 
figure 7), we find at cooperator frequencies 0.7 to 1 the 
threshold of relative C allele/D allele fitness. There is 
little difference between the fitness of the C and D alleles 
at this point in the parameter space, thus there is an 
absence of strong selection on these loci, resulting in the 
mean cooperation level observed. 
Conclusions 
This paper has presented a theoretical examination of the 
possible mechanisms underlying emergent cooperation in 
a viscous population multi-agent system. These 
examinations, in conjunction with empirical data from the 
model, conclude that the model presented allows for 
cooperation to emerge both through iterated interaction 
and through kin selection. The methods presented allow 
for the differentiation of the two mechanisms underlying 
cooperation in different cases of the presented model. 
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